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THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS: ADVANTAGES OF A
“METHODS” APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL
Benjamin Kastan*
INTRODUCTION
Breathing through chemical smoke has been described as “drowning
on dry land.”1 When one imagines chemical weapons, one often imagines
that indelible image of Doughboys choking in trenches through a fog of
yellow mustard gas. Though World War I did not see the first use of
chemical weapons, it did produce the first large-scale industrialized
chemical warfare. The effects of this kind of warfare live on in the
conventions and taboos associated with chemical weapons. In 1993, the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical
Weapons Convention, or CWC) was signed and later ratified by the U.S.
and 187 other states.2 The history of the legal regime surrounding chemical
weapons (CW) reflects the long-term trend of banning weapons systems
and technologies that are considered inhumane or undesirable. However,
these legal regimes often have difficulty keeping up with the pace of
technology and sometimes restrict the use of potentially more humanitarian
weapons systems. One such example is the development of non-lethal
weapons (NLW).3 The CWC provides some leeway in this regard by
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1. Jacques Forster, Vice-President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Statement at the International
Seminar on the Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat: Preventing the Use of Biological and
Chemical Weapons (Oct. 6, 2005).
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-219, 1974
U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 334-35 (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf.
3. The term “non-lethal weapons” has proven extremely controversial as it is not an accurate
description of the technologies and weapons that fall within the category. Even advocates of NLW do
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allowing for the use of one type of non-lethal chemical weapons, Riot
Control Agents (RCAs), in law enforcement.
The debate over RCAs mirrors in large part the debate over weapons
conventions generally. Some military officials have advocated getting rid
of weapons conventions in favor of internal reviews.4 The most prominent
example of this view can be found in the writing of General John
Alexander, former Commander of the Joint Non-lethal Weapons
Directorate (JNLWD). He argues that these conventions are fundamentally
flawed because they focus on the technology rather than undesired results.5
Advocates of the weapons conventions counter that so-called NLW are not
so non-lethal.6 They further contend that non-lethal chemical weapons,
including RCAs, are dangerous to use on the battlefield because they are
“threshold weapon[s],” which may lead to faster escalation to more lethal
chemical weapons.7
This note will analyze how the CWC affects how the U.S. may use
RCAs in a war zone and compares the result to that from a more basic
review guided by the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)––a
review grounded in the methods, rather than the means of warfare. I apply
these rules to hypotheticals drawn from real world examples, and argue that
the most significant differences between the means-based CWC approach
and the methods-based LOAC approach are in the weapons available for
use against combatants, not the impact on civilians. Nevertheless, I do not
advocate withdrawal of the U.S. from the CWC regime because history
suggests that using chemical NLW on the battlefield may make war no
more humane than before. However, the example of RCAs within the
means-based CWC regime demonstrates the limitations and the unintended
consequences of an arms control regime focused on the “means” of
warfare. A more basic LOAC approach that focuses on the methods of
warfare, rather than the means, may better balance the humanitarian
not claim they are fully non-lethal, but simply less lethal. This note will use the Department of
Defense’s intent-based definition of NLW as “a weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily
employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.” U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Nonlethal
Weapon, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data
/n/11245.html (last visited May 6, 2011).
4. See generally John B. Alexander, Optional Lethality, 23 HARV. INT’L REV., no. 2, 2001, at
64, available at http://hir.harvard.edu/the-future-of-war/optional-lethality.
5. JOHN B. ALEXANDER, FUTURE WAR 198-99 (1999).
6. NEIL DAVISON, ‘NON-LETHAL’ WEAPONS 3 (2009) (highlighting the intent rather than effectbased definition of non-lethal).
7. See generally Kyle M. Ballard, Convention in Peril? Riot Control Agents and the Chemical
Weapons Ban, ARMS CONTROL TODAY Sept. 2007, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2007_09/RiotFeature.
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interests than flat weapons bans. Thus, I conclude that the U.S. should
consider pursuing (1) new treaties to focus and elaborate on the rules
governing methods of warfare rather than the means and (2) stronger
internal reviews of new weapons systems around the world. By using
widely-accepted standards, the international humanitarian system may
prove better able to adapt to ever-changing technological realities.
I. THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND RCAS
Chemical weapons have, for at least the last century, been viewed as a
dishonorable and offensive kind of weapon.8 However, chemical weapons
of some sort have been part of warfare as far back as Thucydides, when
“the Peloponnesians . . . tried to reduce the town of Plataea with sulphur
fumes in the fifth century BC.”9 The first international agreement aimed at
restricting their use took place at the Hague Conference of 1899, where
certain attendees agreed “to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gas.”10 The
two most significant military powers to refuse the above provision were the
U.S. and the U.K. By the outbreak of World War I, a more universal taboo
against the use of chemical weapons began to take hold. In the Great War,
German forces “handed the allies a propaganda coup” by being the first to
use lethal chemical munitions.11 This first-to-act status enabled their
adversaries to blame Germany for “the initiation of ‘frightfulness’ (as gas
warfare was dubbed).”12 It is important to note that some of the chemical
weapons used in WWI were RCAs, including, “[l]achrymators (tearproducing agents) like . . . chloroacetophenone (CN), along with vomiting
agents.”13 Initially, CN gas was developed for domestic law enforcement
use in France.14 In fact, the first chemical munition brought to the front was
a canister of CN gas carried by a French policeman.15
The inter-war period saw a proliferation of international institutions
and conventions. Among these newly founded agreements was the
8. BARRY R. SCHNEIDER, FUTURE WAR AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION: U.S. MILITARY
RESPONSES TO NBC PROLIFERATION THREATS 84 (1999).
9. EDWARD M. SPIERS, A HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 28 (2010);
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 172 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972).
10. Id. at 29.
11. Id. at 31.
12. Id.
13. Kip Lindberg, The Use of Riot Control Agents During the Vietnam War, ARMY CHEMICAL
REV., Jan.-June 2007, at 51.
14. DAVISON, supra note 6, at 16.
15. James D. Fry, Gas Smells Awful: U.N. Forces, Riot-Control Agents and the Chemical
Weapons Convention, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 475, 481 (2010).
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Washington Treaty, championed by the U.S. The Washington Treaty
established that “[t]he use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is prohibited.16 This
agreement is notable in that it did not prohibit the stockpiling or
development of chemical weapons––simply their use. Additionally, the
U.S. did not consider RCAs “chemical weapons.”17 The language of the
Washington Treaty was reproduced in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which the
U.S. signed, though did not actually ratify until 1975.18
During World War II, none of the belligerents used chemical
weapons, though all maintained capabilities in the area.19 The reasons for
the non-use of chemical weapons varied, but in part it was based on the fear
of alienating neutral parties, fear of retaliation in kind, and the limited
utility of chemical weapons in a fast-moving war.20
The next major use of chemical weapons came in Vietnam, where the
U.S. used chemical defoliants to destroy ambush-friendly jungles21 and riot
control agents, including ortho-chlorobenzylidene-malononitrile (CS), to
force enemy combatants out of hiding in order to facilitate lethal
targeting.22 The use of such chemicals in Vietnam stirred outrage in much
of the international community and within the U.S.23 In response, the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1969 passed Resolution 2603A,
“which purportedly gave its definitive interpretation of the [Geneva]
Protocol to include tear gas.”24 However, the status of tear gas, RCAs, and
other chemical agents remained unresolved.
II. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND RCAS
States party to the 1993 CWC have agreed “never under any
circumstances” to develop, use, prepare its military to use chemical
weapons, or to assist anyone in doing so.25 The Convention defines

16. Edward Spiers, Gas Disarmament in the 1920s: Hopes Confounded, 29 J. STRATEGIC STUD.
281, 289 (2006) (quoting 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 269 (1992)).
17. Lindberg, supra note 13, at 51.
18. SPIERS, supra note 9, at 51; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
94 L.N.T.S. 65.
19. See SPIERS, supra note 9, at 59.
20. Id. at 58-60.
21. Lloyd G. Miller, The Use of Chemicals in Stability Operations, MIL. REV., Dec. 1966, at 43,
46.
22. Lindberg, supra note 13, at 52.
23. Miller, supra note 21, at 46.
24. Fry, supra note 15, at 484.
25. CWC, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
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chemical weapons inter alia as “(a) [t]oxic chemicals and their precursors,
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.”26
Separately, the CWC defines those purposes not prohibited under the
Convention as peaceful research, protective purposes, military purposes
“not connected with the use of chemical weapons,” (such as using weedkilling chemicals on military bases) and “(d) [l]aw enforcement including
domestic riot control purposes.”27 It further defines toxic chemical as
“[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or
animals.”28 Parties to the CWC also agree to not use RCAs “as a method of
warfare.”29 The CWC defines Riot Control Agents as “any chemical not
listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory
irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time
following termination of exposure.”30 Thus, the CWC exempts RCAs and
other law enforcement related toxic chemicals from the definition of
chemical weapon, but prohibits the use of RCAs as a method of warfare.
The text of the CWC leaves a great deal of ambiguity on a number of
important questions. For instance, the CWC declares that chemicals
intended for purposes not prohibited, such as law enforcement, are not
chemical weapons.31 However, the CWC does not specify whether the
relevant intent concerns the design or use of the chemicals. If a toxic
chemical is designed and intended for use in law enforcement but used in a
non-law enforcement manner, would the CWC prohibit such use?32
Additionally, defining “law enforcement” and “method of warfare”
has proven exceedingly difficult. These two terms are “important concepts

26. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
27. Id. art. 2(9).
28. Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
29. Id. art. 1(5).
30. Id. art. 2(7).
31. See id. art. 2(1)(a).
32. This ambiguity may be limited some by the requirement that toxic chemicals exempted under
this “purposes not prohibited” section also be of a type and quantity consistent with their asserted nonprohibited purposes. See id. Presumably, if a certain toxic chemical intended for law enforcement use
were used, for instance, as a “method of warfare,” such use would require the offending party to
stockpile the chemicals in such a way as to violate the consistent type and quantity provision.
Additionally, using a toxic chemical as a method of warfare, even if not strictly prohibited by the text,
should be seen as forbidden. One must interpret treaties consistent with their object and purpose and not
act contrary to that purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31(1), 18, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the Vienna Convention has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate, it is
considered to be an accurate codification of customary international law. See Chubb & Son, Inc. v.
Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000).
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[that] were left undefined by the negotiators [of the CWC].”33 It seems
clear from the negotiating history of the treaty that these terms were
deliberately left undefined in order to achieve a more widespread
acceptance of the Convention, in particular by the U.S.34 Several questions
have been raised regarding the scope of “law enforcement activities.” Some
have included peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as “law
enforcement,” while others claim that such use would be a violation of the
CWC.35
Counter-terrorism operations cause particular difficulties for the “law
enforcement” term. For instance, in 2002 Chechen terrorists took control of
the Dubrovka Theatre Center in Moscow, taking 800 hostages.36 The
terrorists wired the theatre to explode and strapped suicide vests to
themselves.37 After a three day standoff and after one hostage had been
executed, Russian special forces (Spetsnaz) raided the theatre.38 However,
before breaching they filled the theatre with an aerosolized chemical
incapacitant.39 In the ensuing raid, 125 hostages died (all by complications
from the chemical agent), scores more were injured and all the terrorists
were killed. Almost all of the terrorists had been incapacitated by the
chemical agent, but when the Spetsnaz entered the theatre they shot those
who had not been affected and “peremptorily executed” those terrorists
who had been knocked unconscious.40 The vexing question this situation
posed to the CWC regime was whether this raid was “law enforcement” or
a military operation. Military forces were used in the raid against those
currently engaging in what the Russian Constitutional Court has called an
armed conflict with the Russian Federation.41 Nevertheless, many writers
have opined that the use of a chemical agent in this raid was consistent with

33. MICHAEL CROWLEY, DANGEROUS AMBIGUITIES: REGULATION OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 10 (October 2009), available at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/publications/BNLWRPDangerous1.pdf.
34. Ernest Harper, A Call for a Definition of Method of Warfare in Relation to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 136-37 (2001).
35. Fry, supra note 15, at 506.
36. David A. Koplow, Tangled Up in Khaki and Blue: Lethal and Non-lethal Weapons in Recent
Confrontations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 703, 770-71 (2005).
37. Id. at 771.
38. Id. at 771-72.
39. David P. Fidler, Incapacitating Chemical and Biochemical Weapons and Law Enforcement
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, in INCAPACITATING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS 175 (Alan
Pearson et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Fidler, Incapacitating CBW].
40. Koplow, supra note 36, at 772.
41. Paola Gaeta, The Armed Conflict in Chechnya Before the Russian Constitutional Court, 7
EUR. J. INT’L L. 563, 568 (1996).
AND INCAPACITANTS
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the CWC.42 Would this analysis be the same had it occurred in Chechnya
itself as other military operations were ongoing in the region? The question
would be much less likely to yield a majority opinion than the Dubrovka
raid did.43
Another ambiguous phrase is “method of warfare.” The “method of
warfare” restriction is meant to prevent confusion on the battlefield which
may lead to the escalation from RCA to lethal CW.44 Many international
treaties concerning the LOAC use the term “method of warfare.” Most such
treaties, however, refer to “methods or means of warfare.”45 The omission
of “means of warfare” from the CWC has led to wrangling about the
difference between “means” and “methods” of warfare.46 There is no
“widely accepted, or even readily identifiable, definition [of either term] in
all of international law.”47 Nevertheless, in common usage, “means”
generally refers to the tools of war, i.e. weapons, while “methods” refers to
the manner in which those weapons are used.48 Omission of the term
“means” may signify that there are cases where use of RCA would be
lawful in war. If the drafters of the treaty meant to ban every use of RCA in
a war zone then it would have been better to include or only use the phrase
“means of warfare.” However, as in the case of “law enforcement,” “[t]his
ambiguity is precisely what led to the inclusion of the term method of
warfare in the language of the Convention.”49 Nevertheless, there have
been calls both from the arms control community and from military
lawyers for greater clarity in this area.50

42. See, e.g., Fidler, Incapacitating CBW, supra note 39, at 174.
43. See, e.g., CROWLEY, supra note 33, at 34; see also Ballard, supra note 7 (“The definition of
law enforcement should mean domestic law enforcement within the recognized, sovereign borders of a
country and activities undertaken in conjunction with a UN mandate.”).
44. Harper, supra note 34, at 151-52.
45. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 35, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter AP I]. Though the U.S. is not a party to AP I, it does follow some
provisions as a matter of policy and considers other provisions reflective of customary international
law. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S.
ARMY, Law of War, in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 9, 11, n.6 (2010) [hereinafter OPLAW
HANDBOOK].
46. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 34, at 154.
47. Id. at 133.
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Lawand, Reviewing the Legality of New Weapons, Means and Methods of
Warfare, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 925, 927 (2006).
49. Harper, supra note 34, at 133.
50. Id. at 159.
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III. THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE CWC
The U.S. interpretations of the CWC, especially the provisions
regarding method of warfare and law enforcement, are generally at odds
with those of the rest of the States Parties to the CWC, even close allies
like the United Kingdom. Geoff Hoom, then-U.K. Defense Secretary, said
in 2003 that non-lethal chemical weapons “would not be used by the
United Kingdom in any military operations or on any battlefield.”51 The
U.S., on the other hand, has a more moderate interpretation of chemical
weapons. Since nearly the beginning of efforts to control chemical
weapons, the U.S. has announced that it does not consider RCAs to be
chemical weapons.52 This interpretation was first codified in Executive
Order 11850 and emphasized by the U.S. Senate in its advice and
consent.53 The main objection to this interpretation concerns the threat of
escalation from RCAs to other chemical agents. Critics point out that
before more lethal agents were used in WWI, the Iran-Iraq war, and other
chemical conflicts, RCAs were deployed.54 Defenders of the U.S. position
would respond that it is quite simple to tell the difference between RCAs
and more toxic chemical agents. Additionally, the Executive Order restricts
the use of RCAs to defensive modes where escalation would be least likely.
A. Executive Order 11850
Executive Order 11850 [EO 11850] was first issued by President Ford
in 1975. It was considered “a compromise policy . . . [that maintained the]
military’s ability to use RCA’s.”55 EO 11850 outlines four acceptable uses
of RCAs:
(a) Use of riot control agents in areas under direct and distinct U.S
military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to
mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated
areas of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists
51. CROWLEY, supra note 33, at 28 (internal quotation marks removed).
52. Harper, supra note 34, at 134.
53. See Exec. Order No. 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,187 (Apr. 8, 1975) [hereinafter EO 11,850]; 143
CONG. REC. S3657 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997).
54. Fry, supra note 15, at 540 (“‘[E]very confirmed resort to lethal chemical warfare has started
with tear gas.’”) (quoting “Non-Lethal” Weapons, the CWC and the BWC, 61 CBW CONVENTIONS
BULL., Sept. 2003, at 2).
55. Harper, supra note 34, at 135-36.
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and paramilitary organizations.56

Further, before using RCAs in war, such use must be approved by the
President.57 Thus, RCAs are in the rather unique position of being a
weapon system whose use is so restricted that it must be approved by the
President prior to its use on the battlefield. Most other weapons systems, by
contrast, must simply be approved ex ante by a competent legal reviewer.58
Nevertheless, some prominent commentators have argued that sections (b)
and (c) of EO 11850 are inconsistent with the CWC.59
B. Understandings of the CWC
The CWC was a contentious treaty when President Clinton brought it
to the Senate for ratification. As part of the compromise which facilitated
ratification, the Senate included an interpretation of the CWC as applied to
Riot Control Agents in its advice and consent resolution.60 The Senate
resolved that “the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its
use of riot control agents, including use against combatants who are parties
to a conflict” in three cases: (1) where the U.S. is not a party to the conflict,
(2) consensual Chapter VI peacekeeping operations and (3) Chapter VII
peacekeeping operations.”61 Additionally, the Senate imposed a condition
that “[t]he President shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule or
regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April
8, 1975.”62
IV. CURRENT APPROACH TO REGULATING THE MEANS AND
METHODS OF WARFARE
There are three principal sources of LOAC as it concerns means and
methods63 of warfare: (1) means-specific treaties like the CWC, (2) treaty
56. EO 11,850, supra note 53.
57. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-11.11, FLAME, RIOT CONTROL AGENT, AND
HERBICIDE OPERATIONS 1-2 (March 2003) (“Only the President may authorize the following: •Use of
RCAs in war, including defensive military modes.”).
58. INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL LEGAL CENTER AND
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 142 (Brian Bill ed., 2010) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR
DESKBOOK], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOW-Deskbook-2010.pdf.
59. Fidler, Incapacitating CBW, supra note 39, at 182; Nicholas Wade & Eric Schmitt, A Nation
at War: Weapons; Use of Tear Gas Could Violate Treaty, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2003,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE4D61438F936A35757C0A9659C8B63.
60. 143 CONG. REC. S3657 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997).
61. Id. § 26(A).
62. Id. § 26(B).
63. There is no widely accepted definition of either “means” or “methods” of warfare. Harper,
supra note 34, at 133 This note, however, will follow the International Committee of the Red Cross’
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rules governing the methods of warfare and (3) Martens Clause material—
customary law and general principles of international law.
Like the CWC, other arms control treaties forbid the use of certain
means of warfare. For instance, the Biological Weapons Convention
prohibits the use of “[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes.”64 Another line of treaties bans certain kinds of “conventional
weapons.” For instance, the UN Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons has several protocols, each dealing with a different means of
warfare, such as blinding lasers.65 Some of the oldest weapons bans
concern conventional weapons. The 1899 Hague Declaration banned the
use of expanding or “dum-dum” bullets.66 The reasons for the bans varied,
but all were generally justified on humanitarian grounds.67
The second method of regulating warfare is the control of the methods
of warfare combatants can employ. The Geneva Conventions, for instance,
prohibit attacks on protected targets.68 Commanders must take into account
whether a given attack on a military target will result in disproportionate
injury to civilian lives and property.69 These prohibitions and analytical
methods are then turned into fact-specific regulations for combatants
through the rules of engagement.70 The rules of engagement take into
account legal constraints, the policy objectives of the mission, and the
overall strategic interests of the campaign.71 They inform the combatant
usage of those terms. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW
WEAPONS,
MEANS
AND
METHODS
OF
WARFARE
11,
(2006),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0902.htm [hereinafter GUIDE TO LEGAL
REVIEW] (describing means of warfare as weapons, while methods of warfare as how the means are
used). Thus, the “means” of warfare will include weapons systems and platforms (e.g., an M1A1
Abrams tank or RCA canister). “Methods,” by contrast, means the ways in which those weapons are
used at the tactical level. In this case, the means would be non-lethal chemical weapons (NLCW) and
the method would be the use of NLCW against a given target (e.g. enemy combatants hiding in a cave).
64. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction art. 1(1), Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter BWC].
65. See, e.g., Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Additional Protocol IV to the UN Convention
on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980), 13 Oct. 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370
[hereinafter AP IV to the CCW].
66. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 17.
67. See, e.g., BWC, supra note 64, Preamble ¶ 10.
68. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].
69. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 20.
70. Id. at 73.
71. Id. at 73-74.
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about when he can employ the means of warfare at his disposal and against
whom.72
There is a wide swath of warfare which is covered by no positive
international law. Where there is no positive international law, nations
should look to customary international law (CIL) and general principles of
international law for guidance.73 This idea comes in part from the Martens
Clause of the 1899 Hague Convention, which was then reproduced in
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.74 The contours of
what this clause means, however, are subject to a vigorous debate.75 Some
believe that the Martens Clause is merely a reminder that non-positive
international legal norms exist.76 Others contend that it “has a normative
status in its own right and therefore works independently of other norms.”77
To some extent the clause reflects the natural law origins of much of the
LOAC principles.78
After the rapid codification of LOAC, the basic principles can be
gathered from the various international treaties and relevant state practice.
Though these principles are reflected in treaty law, they are also generally
considered CIL and thus are binding even on states not party to the relevant
conventions. These principles are: the principle of discrimination,79 the
principle of proportionality,80 and the principle of humanity.81

72. Id. at 73.
73. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
paras. 74, 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion].
74. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, INT’L REV. RED
CROSS, Apr. 30, 1997, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnhy.htm (last
visited May 6, 2011); AP I, supra note 45, art. 1(2).
75. See Emily Crawford, The Modern Relevance of the Martens Clause, 6 ISIL Y.B. INT’L
HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE L. 1, 2, 7 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810177 (last
visited May 8, 2011).
76. Id. at 18.
77. Ticehurst, supra note 74.
78. Id.
79. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; GC
IV, supra note 68; AP I, supra note 45, art. 51(4).
80. AP I, supra note 45, art. 51; see generally Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29A, Judgment and Opinion (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
81. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague IV]; AP I, supra note 45, art. 35(2).
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A. Discrimination and Proportionality
The basic principle of discrimination is that combatants must
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and refrain from
attacking civilians or civilian objects.82 Additionally, in any attack on
combatants, the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian
property incidental to attacks must be proportionate to the concrete and
direct military advantage expected to be gained.83 It can be difficult to
apply both of these principles in the context of non-lethal weapons.
Traditionally, attack meant lethal attack.84 However, many argue that “the
term ‘attack’ logically includes all acts that cause violent consequences,
i.e., death or injury to civilians (including significant human physical or
mental suffering) or damage to, or destruction of, tangible civilian
objects.”85
Non-lethal weapons, including riot control agents, may cause death or
serious injury among a percentage of the targeted group. Even Oleoresin
Capsicum (OC), pepper spray, “can cause respiratory failure in susceptible
individuals.”86 RCAs like chlorobenzylidene-malononitrile (CS) and
chloroacetophenone (CN) “have a lethality rate of approximately 0.5 %.”87
For comparison, the lethality rates for military-grade individual firearms is
approximately 35%, and that of artillery, approximately 20%.88 Because
RCAs are not fully non-lethal, some have concluded that “the use of an
indiscriminate ‘non-lethal’ weapon just because civilians are incapacitated
but not killed would eat at the heart of the [International Humanitarian
Law] protections for civilians.”89 In an armed conflict, a civilian or other
non-combatant may only be targeted, even by a non-lethal weapon, if it is

82. GC IV, supra note 68, Art. 27; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art.
13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513.
83. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 157 (2005).
84. Richard Taylor, The Capture Versus Kill Debate: Is the Principle of Humanity Now Part of
the Targeting Analysis when Attacking Civilians who Are Directly Participating in Hostilities, 2010
ARMY LAW 103, 109 (“Numerous scholars agree that the plain meaning of attack is the application of
lethal force against an enemy.”).
85. Michael Schmidt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 291 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).
86. M.C. JORDAN, LEGAL REVIEW OF OLEORESIN CAPSICUM (OC) PEPPER SPRAY, REPORT TO
THE COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND 5 (1998), available at http://www.sunshineproject.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/jagocrev.pdf.
87. Fry, supra note 15, at 538.
88. Id. at 537-38; see also David P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal”
Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51, 56 (1999) [hereinafter Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons].
89. Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 88, at 84.
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necessary in response to a hostile act and proportional to the threat.90 By
contrast, absent the CWC and the Geneva Gas Protocol, there would be
nothing in LOAC which would prohibit the use of RCAs against
combatants, so long as harm to civilians was proportionate.
B. Humanity – Avoiding Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering
Traditionally, this principle prohibited the use of weapons such as
dum-dum bullets, which were deemed to cause injury disproportionate to
its military effectiveness.91 The ICRC has suggested that one determines
which weapons cause such injury or suffering by analyzing “designdependent, foreseeable effects of weapons when they are used against
human beings.”92 RCAs usually cause no permanent injury and have an
extremely low lethality rate.93 Comparing such a low injury and death rate
to potentially great military advantage would weigh heavily in their favor.
Therefore, they would pass the per se superfluous injury inquiry.
Unnecessary suffering is generally considered to be the “balancing of
the military necessity in employing a weapon and the likely suffering
occasion by that employment.”94 This analysis would be much more factspecific. Generally, one must compare “other existing technologies and
comparable wounding mechanisms” to determine whether the suffering is
necessary or unnecessary.95 Thus, there must be an ongoing and factspecific process of legal review.96
V. APPLICATION OF THE CWC AND THE LOAC GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
In this section, I will apply the law from the CWC, including its
ambiguities, to three hypotheticals, loosely based on real situations––one in
Iraq and two in Afghanistan. Then, I will apply the LOAC general
principles to the same situations and compare the results from the two
modes of analysis.

90.
91.
92.
93.

JORDAN, supra note 86, at 6.
LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 58, at 142.
Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 88, at 87.
U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 8-9, NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL
ASPECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS § 701 (1996).
94. JORDAN, supra note 86, at 6-7.
95. Id. at 7.
96. See id. at 6.
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A. Iraq
1. Human Shields in Basra during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq97
A large unit of the fedayeen have taken refuge in Basra. They have
placed tanks near schools and positioned their command and control in
hospitals, surrounding themselves with civilians. The civilians are
unwilling human shields, but cannot escape the city. Many civilians and
friendly forces will die if coalition forces attempt to take the city. The
fedayeen refuse to surrender and will continue using human shields if the
Coalition forces attempt to take the city. Could the Coalition employ RCAs
to separate the combatants and non-combatants?
a. CWC
Under the non-U.S. interpretation of the CWC, the answer is a
straightforward “no.” As mentioned above, U.K. forces, for instance, would
not be allowed to use RCAs in this circumstance. U.S. forces, however,
may be able to under EO 11850(b), as this is a case where arguably
civilians are being used to screen the fedayeen force. Normally,
“screening” an attack means to use another force (in this case civilians) to
protect the advance of the main force in question.98 Most likely, the use of
human shields in this case would qualify as “screening.” However, the
word “attack” causes some problems, as “attack” normally means an
offensive movement.99 Thus, under most readings of EO 11850, use of
RCAs would only be permitted in “defensive modes.”100
The fundamental question under the CWC analysis is whether the
combatant is using RCAs as a “method of warfare.” Understanding the
plain meaning of “method of warfare,” the regular use of RCAs, even in
defensive or life-saving postures, may suggest that they are being used as a
“method” as opposed to simply a “means.”101 There is no exception in the
CWC for use of RCAs as a less-damaging method of warfare. Thus, the
CWC, even under the U.S. interpretation, would probably prohibit the use
97. See Koplow, supra note 36, at 781-88 (relating the background of the British assault on
Basra, upon which this hypothetical is based).
98. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-92, THE INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE
PLATOON AND SQUAD (AIRBORNE, AIR ASSAULT, LIGHT INFANTRY) paras. 5-2, 5-5 (1992) (describing
how “screening” forces are used to protect a main force and provide advance information), available at
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/FM%207-92%20W%20CH%201.pdf.
99. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-21.8, INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON AND
SQUAD para. 7-10 (1992), available at https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/
public/23583-1/FM/3-21.8/chap7.htm#2 (“An attack is an offensive action characterized by movement
supported by fire.”).
100. See, e.g., OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 18.
101. GUIDE TO LEGAL REVIEW, supra note 63, at 11.
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of RCAs in this context.
b. LOAC
LOAC principles lead to a very different conclusion than the CWC
analysis. The RCAs here are deployed against combatants specifically to
minimize damage to civilians, in an effort to abide by the principle of
discrimination. The targets of this attack are the combatants, not the
civilians, thus a proportionality analysis must be conducted. The damage to
civilians in terms of collateral damage in using RCAs would be minimal,
while the discrete and concrete military advantage—forcing the combatants
into the open—is clear. Thus, the attack would be proportionate. When
comparing the lethality rates of RCAs to the use of high explosives, for
instance artillery, the balance clearly favors the RCAs, 0.5% to 20%.102
Therefore, the attack would not cause unnecessary suffering. However, the
commanders would have to be careful not to target combatants hors de
combat, rendered so by the RCAs.103 Whether the fighters could be targeted
after being driven out by the RCAs would depend on whether or not they
give a clear sign of surrender.104
B. Afghanistan
1. Rioting in Kabul105
An American mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle loses
control and runs over twelve civilian vehicles. Some of the civilians are
injured; others die. News of this traffic accident spreads quickly across the
city and sparks widespread rioting. The protestors attack embassies and
throw stones at U.S. troops. Afghan security forces are deployed to
suppress the riot, but they are unable to control the crowds. The rioters
begin to target aid organizations and government buildings. U.S. soldiers
are called in to respond. Consistent with their Rules of Engagement (ROE),
they demand that the crowd disperse and fire warning shots over the crowd,
to no avail. Can they use RCAs?

102. See supra notes 85-87.
103. See GC IV, supra note 68, art. 3. A person hors de combat is generally a previously targetable
combatant who has been rendered a “protected person” because he has been taken “out of combat” by
some wound or surrender. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 25, 75; see Fry, supra note 15, at
537-38; see Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 88, at 56.
104. JAN RÖMER, KILLING IN A GRAY AREA BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
78 (2010).
105. See Carlotta Gall, Convoy Crash Sparks Kabul Riots, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/29/world/asia/29iht-afghan.1843499.html (describing deadly riots in
Kabul following a fatal traffic accident involving a NATO MRAP).
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a. CWC
The CWC allows for the use of RCAs in “law enforcement.” There is
no textual basis for concluding that this provision only includes domestic
law enforcement. Here, the U.S. troops are arguably enforcing Afghan law
and order. If their presence at the riot was requested by the Afghan
government, they would be on strong legal ground. Additionally, since the
rioters are not combatants, it would be unlikely to be interpreted as using
RCAs as a “method of warfare.” How the U.S. forces could respond to the
riot would arguably be governed by both LOAC and human rights
principles if they are operating in a law enforcement capacity.106 However,
even human rights law allows for the use of force in self-defense and to
disperse riots, so long as that force is proportionate to the threat.107 In this
situation, where the crowd has proved its hostile intent and has thrown
rocks at U.S. forces, it would be proper, even if human rights law applied,
for them to respond with RCAs.108 Of course, under an absolutist
interpretation of the CWC, even this use of RCAs would be disallowed.
b. LOAC
Under LOAC principles, one may not direct violence against civilians
except in self-defense. There is no explicit allowance in the Geneva
Conventions for any use of force, even non-lethal force, against civilians,
unless they are directly participating in hostilities.109 However, the lex
specialis principle may suggest that since Human Rights Law has the more
specific provision regarding the use of force against civilians in a law
enforcement setting, it should govern this situation.110 Further, state
practice suggests that it is acceptable for military force operating in a lawenforcement capacity to use non-lethal munitions and RCAs against
civilians.111 For instance, RCAs were used in the peacekeeping missions in
106. See U.N. HIGH COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT at
131,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.03.XIV.1
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training5Add2en.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT].
107. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crimes and the Treatment of Offenders,
Aug. 27 – Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle
9, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law
/firearms.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
108. Id. Principle 14.
109. See GC IV, supra note 68, art. 27 (“Protected persons . . . shall be protected against all acts of
violence”); AP I, supra note 45, art. 51.
110. Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 225 (2004) (“The maxim lex specialis derogat generalis means broadly
that a specific or special rule of international law is to take precedence over a general rule.”).
111. The Spetsnaz’s use of a fentanyl incapacitant in the Moscow standoff would be a prime
example of such state practice. See, e.g., Fidler, Incapacitating CBW, supra note 39, at 175.
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both Yugoslavia and Liberia.112 Thus, since the civilians have used
violence against the security forces and U.S. troops, they would be justified
in responding with proportionate violence.113 Further, RCAs may be the
least harmful option available to the U.S. forces. Even other NLW, such as
“rubber bullets,” are far more likely to cause injury or death than RCAs.114
Thus, the use of RCAs avoids superfluous injury and unnecessary
suffering. RCAs would therefore be permitted under a simple LOAC
review.
2. Cave Combat
Intelligence reports indicate that some high-level Taliban fighters have
fled into the caves of southern Afghanistan. The caves are heavily fortified
and any raid by ground troops would lead to unacceptable casualties. There
is evidence to suggest that they are looking to fight to the death and will
refuse calls for surrender. The commander’s Staff Judge Advocate advises
him that use of a themobaric weapon would be legal. A thermobaric bomb
would explode near the mouth of the cave and create a huge fireball.115 The
change in pressure and oxygen caused by the fireball would suffocate and
kill nearly everyone in the cave.116 Can the U.S. launch RCAs into the cave
to drive them out?
a. CWC
The CWC would forbid the use of RCAs in this situation. The use of
RCAs against combatants in order to more effectively target them would
not be consistent with the method of warfare restriction. The use of RCAs
as a method of cave combat dates back to the Vietnam war, when U.S.
forces used RCAs to drive the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army out
of their tunnels. In cave combat, the RCAs would arguably both be the
means and the method of warfare. This use of RCAs would even be
disallowed under EO 11850. Since there are no human shields involved,
and none of the other three conditions of EO 11850 are met, the use of
RCAs would be strictly prohibited. Further, state practice indicates this use

112. Fry, supra note 15, at 487, 492.
113. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 106, at 122.
114. Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Israeli Doctors Warn Against Rubber Bullets, 324 BRITISH MED. J.
1296-97 (2002).
115. See BLU-118/ B Thermobaric Weapons, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/munitions/blu-118.htm (last visited May 6, 2011); Pentagon to Use New Bomb on
Afghan Caves, CNN NEWS (December 22, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-12-22/us/ret.new.
weapon_1_caves-and-tunnels-thermobaric-fuel-air?_s=PM:US.
116. See Noah Schachtman, When a Gun Is More than a Gun, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2003),
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/03/58094.
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would be disallowed. In the 1999 fighting in Chechnya, for instance,
Russian forces used thermobaric weapons because the use of chemical
munitions was forbidden.117
b. LOAC
Under the LOAC principles, this use of RCAs would be permitted.
There are no civilians present and the combat is not likely to result in any
damage to civilian lives or property. Thus, there is no distinction problem.
Under proportionality, there is no civilian cost, so the use of RCAs would
be proportionate to the military necessity. Further, RCAs may be the most
humane option available. If the best alternative weapon system is a
thermobaric bomb, discussed above, then RCAs look extremely humane by
contrast. The use of an RCA in a cave would likely lead to higher lethality
and greater injury than using an RCA in the open would, as the toxic
concentration would be higher.118 However, even this appears to be more
humane that the thermobaric option. Thus, the U.S. could use the RCAs in
this context under the basic LOAC principles.
VI. ARGUMENT
Using solely the methods-based LOAC framework leads to far fewer
restrictions on the use of RCAs than the CWC imposes. The most
prominent difference in the use of RCAs is in the targeting of combatants,
especially as a force multiplier and in the cave context. However, given the
unique context and history of chemical weapons, substantially modifying
or withdrawing from the CWC regime in order to more fully use RCAs
would not be in the interest of the United States.
RCAs and other NLW give commanders a spectrum of force
options.119 In the case of the Afghan rioters, rather than having to fire over
the heads of the crowd in Kabul, they could have relied on RCAs to
disperse the crowd. Forbidding the use of RCAs in these contexts gives the
commander the option of firing into the crowd or retreating. It is hard to
dispute that RCAs and NLW more broadly provide a middle ground. Yet,
the CWC would, in a theatre of armed conflict, prohibit such a use (if one
adopts the majority understanding). The U.S. understanding, however,

117. Fuel-Air Explosives, GLOBALSECURITY, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions
/fae.htm (last visited May 6, 2011).
118. Koplow, supra note 36, at 762 (describing the questionable safety of CS gas when used in
confined spaces).
119. James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV.
1, 34 (1998).
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would permit the use of RCAs in this fashion.120 Therefore, the U.S.
understanding of RCAs as relates to EO 11850 may be the more “humane”
interpretation. Further, this example demonstrates the limitations of using a
“means of warfare” approach, which focuses on the technology used, rather
than the method by which it is employed.
Arms control “treaties often provide a false sense of security and can
prevent prudent research” into more effective weapons systems.121 The use
of basic principles or “methods” approach allows a much greater flexibility
than a technology specific convention. Rather than focusing on the
technology, focusing on the methods by which weapons could be used
would allow legal advisers to always keep in mind the ultimate objective of
LOAC—to reduce unnecessary human suffering in war. For instance, if
there were a new chemical incapacitant which had a lethality rate under
about 10%, would it not be preferable in humanitarian terms to traditional
high explosive munitions? To be sure, there are some severe risks with this
system. As the Russian opera house siege makes clear, just because
someone is incapacitated does not mean that they will be spared from
kinetic targeting.122 There is no guarantee that even the best NLW available
would be used in a non-lethal manner. However, like any other weapon
system, NLW would be subject to the existing methods of warfare
restrictions.123
Additionally, the weakness of the methods approach is that while the
CWC has one or two points of ambiguity, the entire LOAC analysis is
fraught with ambiguous terms. Its flexibility is therefore both its greatest
strength and its greatest weakness. Unlike interpretations of the CWC,
however, there is a great deal of state practice upon which one can base
interpretations of the LOAC principles.124 Additionally, with the creation of
the ICC and the case law from the ad hoc tribunals, there has been and will
likely continue to be a great deal of persuasive interpretations of the LOAC
principles.125

120. See EO 11,850, supra note 53.
121. Alexander, supra note 4, at 67.
122. See David P. Fidler, The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-lethal” Weapons and International Law
in the 21st Century, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 525, 533 (Sept. 2005).
123. Id. at 530-31.
124. Compare Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 75. Riot Control Agents,
ICRC: CUSTOMARY IHL, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule75 (last visited May
8, 2011), with Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 47. Attacks Against Persons
Hors de Combat, ICRC: CUSTOMARY IHL, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule47
(last visited May 8, 2011).
125. See, e.g., Practice Relating to Rule 47, supra note 124 (discussing international criminal
tribunals and their impact on customary international humanitarian law).
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A possible objection to the methods system would be that the major
innovation of the CWC was its monitoring and compliance mechanisms.
Unlike the CWC, there is no accountability or monitoring mechanism for
the LOAC reviews. Yet, even the CWC is ultimately a voluntary body of
law.126 It depends on the cooperation and the consent of the States Parties
to make it function. Nothing guarantees that states will follow arms control
treaties with specific provisions more than they would the broad LOAC
principles. There have been several prominent examples of arms control
treaties being immediately and secretly undermined by the States Parties.
For instance, almost immediately following the signing of the Biological
Weapons Convention, the USSR began the most extensive bioweapon
program to date.127
In some instances, being able to use RCA in a theatre of war may be
both more humane and more effective than the use of other weapons.
However, the U.S. should not withdraw from the CWC regime. Given the
history of CW, including their history of misuse, withdrawing from the
CWC would risk hindering our ability to work in military coalitions.
Further, withdrawing from the CWC would forever link future systems,
including non-lethal weapons, to the horrors of chemical weapons and
thereby impair their legitimacy.128
Nevertheless, the example of non-lethal CW shows the limits of
positive international law in the context of arms control. This example has
particular relevance looking forward as new weapons systems, from
unmanned vehicles to directed energy weapons, come online.129 For these
new weapons systems, the existing regulations on the methods of warfare
will govern.130 The ICJ had the opportunity to consider such a situation in
the court’s advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons.131 In that
case, the question presented to the court was whether nuclear weapons
could ever be used in a manner consistent with international law.132 The
126. Thomas Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F. L.
REV. 229, 244 (2001).
127. Alexander, Optional Lethality, supra note 4, at 67.
128. See GRAHAM ALLISON ET AL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NONLETHAL WEAPONS
AND CAPABILITIES 32 (2004) (discussing how withdrawing from the CWC would risk “impairing the
legitimacy of all NLW”).
129. See, e.g., U.S. AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY, FACT SHEET: ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEM
ADVANCED
CONCEPT
TECHNOLOGY
DEMONSTRATION
(2006),
available
at
http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404-026.pdf; MARC RAIBERT ET AL.,
BIGDOG THE ROUGH TERRAIN QUADUPED [sic]
ROBOT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.bostondynamics.com/img/BigDog_IFAC_Apr-8-2008.pdf.
130. Duncan, supra note 119, at 26.
131. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 73, para. 85.
132. Id. para. 20.
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court responded that it would generally be illegal to use nuclear weapons,
except in the most extreme circumstances of self-defense.133 The court,
lacking existing positive law, relied heavily on basic principles of LOAC
and a methods-based approach to this means-related question.134 The ICJ
implicitly recognized that positive international law, such as it is, will
always lag developments in technology.135 Standards of humanity and
public conscience, as highlighted in the Martens Clause, on the other hand,
can be applied to every new iteration of military technology.136 The ICJ
opined that this clause “has proved to be an effective means of addressing
the rapid evolution of military technology.”137
Indeed, the Martens Clause is effective as a means to address the rapid
evolution of technology precisely because, unlike the CWC, it establishes
standards, not rules.138 The standards set by LOAC principles can likely
achieve their objectives as well or better than a CWC-style regime of
means-based rules. The rules of the CWC, as this note has demonstrated,
end up forbidding the use of potentially more humane weapons out of a
fear of going down a slippery slope. Chemical weapons are indeed a
uniquely dangerous means of warfare. Mustard gas and aerosolized nerve
agents can strike fear into the heart of every combatant and civilian in an
especially powerful way.139 They have been used to intentionally kill and
disfigure civilian populations.140 However, the fact that these weapons can
be and have been abused does not necessarily mean that a blanket ban on
such weapons best achieves the humanitarian goals of LOAC.
How then can communities concerned with arms control respond? The
solution is not to completely abandon arms control treaties or LOAC rules.
Rather, the solution going forward is two-fold: (1) ensure future arms
treaties focus on the methods of warfare—how should this new weapon
system be used—rather than the means of warfare themselves, and (2)
bolster internal legal reviews for new weapons systems.
133. Id. para. 105.
134. See id. para. 78
135. See id.
136. Id. para. 86 (explaining that the basic principles of LOAC “appl[y] to all forms of warfare and
to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future.”)
137. Id. para. 78.
138. The use of standards to deal with changing technological realities has often been recognized
as superior to a rules-based approach in other contexts. See, e.g., Derek Bambauer, Rules, Standards
and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49, 52 (2010); Paul Otto, Note, Reasonableness Meets
Requirements: Regulating Security and Privacy in Software, 59 DUKE L.J. 309, 337 (2009).
139. See Forster, supra note 1.
140. See generally Gwynne Roberts, Poisonous Weapons, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW (Roy Gutman et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-zguide/poisonous-weapons-2/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).

KASTAN FINAL MACROB (DO NOT DELETE)

288

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/12/2012 12:48 PM

[Vol 22:267

The rationale behind recent arms control treaties, such as the Protocol
on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, is the effect of these weapons on civilians.141 Current arms
control regimes, however, focus on the nature of the weapons. A methods
approach to arms control would focus combatants and their legal advisors
on the fundamental principles of LOAC, such as the minimization of
unnecessary human suffering. Combatants intent on violating LOAC can
inflict massive amounts of harm on civilian populations without advanced
weapons.142 Indeed, some of the most truly horrific abuses in war are
committed with no weapons at all.143 Those combatants who value LOAC
and take its provisions seriously, on the other hand, find themselves forced
to choose a more damaging tactic, such as dropping a fuel-air bomb, when
precluded from using more effective and potentially less harmful means.
An important part of a “methods” approach would be for the U.S. to
champion an agreement which sets international standards for the legal
review of new weapons systems. Articles 35 and 36 of Additional Protocol
1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP1) set out some basic standards for a
legal review of weapons systems. However, “only a limited number of
States[, such as the U.S.,] are known to have put in place mechanisms or
procedures to conduct legal reviews.”144 The U.S. legal reviews look at the
principles of LOAC and at their most likely methods of employment.145
The ICRC has produced a guide which may be a model for such
reviews. The ICRC’s Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means
and Methods of Warfare provides certain guidelines for implementing
Article 36 of AP1. They suggest looking, in addition to treaty law, to
considerations of “public conscience” and the principles of humanity (i.e.,
the LOAC principles). The ICRC points specifically to the Martens Clause
in Article 1(2) of AP1, which states that those areas which fall outside of
the existing legal regime “remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”146By
standardizing international legal reviews, the humanitarian community may
be able to more fully integrate the humanitarian principles that define the
141. See, e.g., Herthel, supra note 126, at 251.
142. See, e.g., Philip Verwimp, Machetes and Firearms: The Organization of Massacres in
Rwanda, 43 J. PEACE RES. 5, 13 (2006).
143. See, e.g., Francois Grignon, Rape as a Weapon of War in Congo, DER SPEIGEL ONLINE, June
11, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,629885,00.html.
144. GUIDE TO LEGAL REVIEW, supra note 63, at 5.
145. Donna M. Verchio, Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned But Unnecessary and
Superfluous, 51 A.F. L. REV. 183, 218-220 (2001).
146. AP I, supra note 45, art. 1(2).
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LOAC into the development and deployment of all new weapons systems.
Additionally, non-legal considerations will always restrict what
weapons a commander can and would choose to use. Any use of a
“cowardly,” over-destructive or indiscriminate weapon will likely be
noticed and publicized. This publicity will undoubtedly affect public
opinion both in the population within which one is fighting and domestic
public opinion. This “lawfare” effect with regard to chemical weapons can
be seen as far back as World War I.147 Indeed, this effect can be quite longlasting. For instance, the use of chemical weapons like Agent Orange
during the Vietnam War has continued to affect U.S. international relations
many decades later.148 In WWI, the German decision to use toxic gas
undoubtedly contributed to the Allies’ narrative of the German nation as
one of barbarians who use such horrible weapons.149 Further, working in a
coalition effectively limits the types of weapons a country can use. For
instance, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, though the President had authorized
the use of RCAs, the use of RCAs in a coalition operation with almost any
of our partners would have been inhibited by their legal obligations.150
In modern conflicts, especially counterinsurgency and military
operations other than war, the perception of illegality or immorality can
prevent the warfighters from achieving their strategic objectives.151
Therefore, even the perception of illegality can be effective at inhibiting the
use of certain weapons systems in modern warfare.152 Even if a given
weapon has certain tactical advantages, lawfare and political realities may
help prevent their use. In this way, concepts like lawfare may help fill the
gaps in a methods-based approach to arms control.

147. The term “lawfare” was first coined by Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap. It generally refers to the
use or misuse of legal tools and perceptions of legality to effect military objectives. See Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts
11 (Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Workshop Paper 2001), available at www.ksg.harvard.
edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.
148. See MICHAEL MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., VIETNAMESE VICTIMS OF AGENT ORANGE
AND U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34761.pdf
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
149. SPIERS, supra note 9, at 31.
150. As noted before, the British had taken an absolutist approach to the use of RCAs, while the
U.S. had authorized their use. Joseph Tessier, Shake & Bake: Dual-use Chemicals, Contexts, and the
Illegality of American White Phosphorous Attacks in Iraq, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 323, 337, 339 (2007).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, THE U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 43 (Dec. 2006).
152. Charles J. Dunlap, Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts, 2009 JOINT
FORCES QUARTERLY, no. 54 at 36.
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CONCLUSION
RCAs have been an element of war since that French policeman first
brought chloroacetophenone, CN gas, to the Western Front. The
international community has responded to the horrors witnessed in war in
two principal ways: by technology-specific treaties and by principles which
govern the ever changing battlefield. The technology-specific treaties may
have had an important role to play in creating and reinforcing norms
against the use of certain weapons that the majority of the human race
considers immoral. However, they often fail to keep pace with technology.
The development and advancement of non-lethal RCAs demonstrates the
weakness of such a regime and that it can inhibit the use of certain
technologies which could help minimize unnecessary human suffering in
war. As the ICJ noted in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, principles of
humanity and the basic principles of LOAC are best situated to keep pace
with technology.153
The principles-based method approach to questions of arms control
has one indelible benefit over means-based treaties: it is timeless. Methods
standards apply to a bow and arrow the same as they do to a Tomahawk
missile. They also direct the analysis immediately to the concern of
LOAC—the minimization of human suffering in war. Perhaps looking to
the future, a re-emphasis of the basic principles of LOAC, either in policy
statements or a new international agreement, would be preferable to a new
arms control treaty. To the extent new technologies threaten to stretch
existing LOAC principles, new treaties should consider the most humane
rules governing their method of use, rather than banning the means itself.
To demonstrate its dedication to such principles, the U.S. may want to push
for a new agreement which expands on AP1, Art. 36 and mandates that all
nations undertake legal reviews of their weapons system. Such internal
reviews may lead to greater internalization of these most important
principles of LOAC and thereby promote the ultimate goal of all LOAC—
to minimize unnecessary human suffering in war.

153. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 73, para 78.

